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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from the Third Judicial District Court for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, involving a domestic relations
case.

Jurisdiction is proper in the Court of Appeals pursuant to

Utah Code

Anno. § 78-2a-3(2)(i) (1953), as amended.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES

I.

Statutes.

The interpretation of the following statute

is determinative of the issue regarding attorney fees:
Utah Code Anno. § 78-27-56(1) (1953), as amended:
In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable
attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court
determines that the action or defense to the action was
without merit and not brought or asserted in good
faith, except under Subsection (2).
II.

Rules.

The interpretation of the following rule is of

central importance to the issues on appeal:
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-501(2):
Motions for summary judgment.
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points
and authorities in support of a motion for summary
judgment shall begin with a section that contains a
concise statement of material facts as to which movant
contends no genuine issue exists. The facts shall be
stated in separate numbered sentences and shall
specifically refer to those portions of the record upon
which the movant relies.
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The
points and authorities in opposition to a motion for
summary judgment shall begin with a section that
contains a concise statement of material facts as to
which the party contends a genuine issue exists. Each
disputed fact shall be stated in separate numbered

1

sentences and shall specifically refer to those
portions of the record upon which the opposing party
relies, and, if applicable, shall state the numbered
sentence or sentences of the movant's facts that are
disputed. All material facts set forth in the movant's
statement and properly supported by an accurate
reference-to the record shall be deemed admitted for
the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically
controverted by the opposing party's statement.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
I.

Introduction.

Appellee, (hereafter Diane Jones), agrees

with Appellant's, (hereafter Jack Jones), statement of the case.
However, she disagrees with his statement of facts.
Rule 27(a)(7), Utah R. App. P. requires that a statement of
the facts, relevant to the issues presented for review, follow
the statement of the case.

Jack's statement of facts is

inappropriate for two reasons.

First, it contains facts which he

did not rely on to oppose Diane's motion for summary judgment or
to support his cross motion for summary judgment.

Second, it

contains facts which are irrelevant to the issues presented for
review and which Diane contends are not true.1
In the trial court, both parties submitted statements of
*For example, Jack asserts that Diane committed to go to
work after law school, that he paid for her education, that they
lived frugally, and that Diane refused to work after finishing
school. Diane's legal education was paid by grants through the
State of Alaska and from the proceeds of the sale of their home
in Alaska, where both parties worked. The parties also jointly
agreed that Diane would stay home and raise their child. In any
event, Jack's assertions are not pertinent to the issues on
appeal.

2

facts they contended were undisputed and facts they contended
were disputed, consistent with Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial
Administration.

These are the only facts relied on by the

parties to support and oppose the motions for summary judgment
and are set forth hereafter.
II.

Facts Relating to the Petition to Terminate Alimony.

Diane and Jack Jones were married July 1st, 1973. (R. 2)
Their divorce was final September 23rd, 1992, terminating a
nineteen year marriage.

(R. 156-164)

They have one minor child,

Amber Jones, born September 3rd, 1979.

(R. 2)

Diane did not work outside the home for more than fifteen
years before the parties separated.

(R. 422)

She attended the

University of Utah School of Law from 1976 through 1979 and
received her Juris Doctor decree in 1979.

(R. 422-423)

She

became licensed to practice in 1979 but remained at home to raise
the parties child.

(R. 423).

After the parties separated, Diane tried to find employment
without success.

Consequently, she borrowed money from her

mother and began practicing law in January, 1992 as a sole
practitioner.

(R. 423)

In the divorce, the trial court scheduled a pretrial for
June 5th and a trial for June 11th, 1992.

(R. 97)

In

preparation for the pretrial, Diane filed her financial
declaration February 6th, 1992.

In the declaration she itemized
3

$1,729 in monthly living expenses and $100 per month income.
81-88)

(R.

Her income was from boarding horses on land adjacent to

the marital home.

In an attachment to the financial declaration,

Diane disclosed the following:
ATTACHMENT (INCOME) - Plaintiff was unemployed at the
time of the parties' separation and had remained at
home as a homemaker for 15 years. Plaintiff attempted
for over a period of 6 months to find a position in
either law practice or other areas. In January 1992,
plaintiff entered into an office sharing arrangement in
Midvale in order to try and generate some income and
increase her practical experience. In order to enter
the practice of law, plaintiff borrowed a substantial
amount of money from family. To this date, plaintiff
is running at a deficit but is making progress in
covering her monthly expenses. She cannot project at
what point her law practice will generate enough income
to cover monthly expenses and repay start up costs.
(R. 86)
Jack also submitted his financial declaration disclosing his
monthly income of $4,300.

(R. 76-80)

On March 17th, 1992, Jack served Diane with requests for
admissions, requests for production of documents and
interrogatories.

(R. 99)

Jack's discovery required Diane to

itemize her business expenses in her law practice and the dollar
amount of retainers received, in addition to producing her bank
statements, deposit slips and checks from her business and
personal accounts.

She provided Jack with all of the requested

information and documents on April 28th, 1992.
438)

4

(R. 423-424, 433-

At the June 5th, 1992 pretrial, both parties were
represented by attorneys.

Jack produced his proposed trial

exhibit entitled "Business Income & Expenses".

(R. 424 & 439)

This exhibit summarized Diane's income from her law practice for
the first four months.

(R. 439)

It was prepared from the

information and documents Diane previously produced for Jack.
(R. 424)

It showed that Diane's average monthly income after

expenses from January through April, 1992, was $1,426.10.
4 39)

(R.

However, Diane pointed out that Jack included the money she

borrowed from her mother to start her practice.

(R. 424)

Jack and Diane also negotiated a settlement agreement which
was read into the record.

(R. 424-425)

Within a few days after

the pretrial, they discovered that they could not implement the
agreement.

They had agreed to a division of certain employment

benefits through a qualified domestic relations order.

However,

these benefits could not be divided and secured to Diane's
benefit through such an order; so they began renegotiating their
agreement.

(R. 425, 499)

At that time, Diane's living expenses were the same as set
forth in her February, 1992 financial declaration.

(R. 425)

These expenses included two payments on two trust deed notes
secured against the marital home.
the marital home to Diane.

(R. 425)

(R. 140, 425)

They agreed to award

They also negotiated a

lump sum payment in lieu of the employment benefit they
5

discovered could not be divided through a qualified domestic
relations order.
425)

The lump sum payment was $14,250.

(R. 142-143,

From Diane's standpoint, this payment was instrumental in

the final alimony settlement because she intended to pay the
second trust deed note off, thereby reducing her monthly expenses
by $290, which she ultimately did.

(R. 425-427)

They also agreed that Jack would pay Diane $4 3 0 per month
child support, based upon Jack's monthly income of $4,3 00 and
Diane f s then $80 per month from boarding horses.
425-42 6)

(R. 138-139,

However, Diane was no longer receiving any income from

boarding horses.

Her only income was from her law practice.

(R.

42 6) In the first settlement agreement, the parties decided that
the land on which Diane was boarding horses would be sold and the
proceeds awarded to Jack.

When the parties negotiated their

final agreement on September 1st, 1992, the land had already been
sold.

They used the old income figures for child support even

though Diane was no longer receiving income from boarding horses.
(R. 426-427)
They also used the old income figures in their alimony
agreement.

The agreement was reduced to writing and signed on

September 1st, 1992.

(R. 137-146)

The alimony agreement is set

forth in paragraph 12 which states:
The parties stipulate and agree that plaintiff's
present monthly gross income is $80.00 and that
defendant's gross monthly income from his employment is
6

$4,300. Based upon the respective parties1 income as
set forth herein, it is stipulated and agreed that the
defendant will pay to the plaintiff, alimony in the sum
of Eight Hundred Dollars ($800.00) per month. It is
further agreed, however, that at such time as Defendant
has paid to Plaintiff the sums immediately due and
owing to her under the terms of this agreement, a total
amount of Fourteen Thousand Two Hundred and Fifty
Dollars, (14,250.00), alimony shall be immediately
reduced to the sum of Six Hundred and Fifty Dollars
($650.00) per month. It is further agreed that
defendant's obligation to pay alimony to the defendant
shall terminate within five years from date of entry of
a decree of divorce herein, or at such time as the
Court may order, based upon a change in plaintiff's
circumstances and plaintiff's ability to provide for
her own support.
It is stipulated and agreed that for purposes of
determining defendant's continued obligation to pay
alimony to plaintiff, plaintiff will provide to
defendant at his request, through her counsel Ronald E.
Kunz, copies of plaintiff's business records and tax
returns, for purposes of determining plaintiff's
continued need to receive alimony from the defendant.
It is further agreed that defendant shall be entitled
to receive such financial information from the
plaintiff every six months, and such information shall
be provided by plaintiff to the defendant within thirty
days after receiving written request therefore. It is
agreed that the defendant may petition the Court, by
way of Motion, for a reduction in alimony payments and
an adjustment of child support based on changes in the
Plaintiff's income from time to time.
(R. 143-144)
Diane contends that alimony was negotiated based upon her
earnings from her law practice since January, 1992, her
anticipated earnings, child support, and her monthly expenses
after paying the second trust deed note off.

The parties did not

attribute any income to Diane from her practice in the written
agreement due to the short time she had been practicing law.

7

So

they put her historical income from boarding horses, $80 per
month, in the stipulated agreement.

(R. 42 6-427)

Diane considered all of the following in coming to the final
alimony agreement:
a.

Diane's income from boarding horses was terminated

because the land was sold and the proceeds awarded to Jack.
b.

After Jack paid Diane the lump sum of $14,250, Diane

could pay the second trust deed note off, thereby reducing her
minimum monthly expenses from $1,729.10 to $1,439.10.

The

agreement to reduce the alimony from $800 to $650 per month after
payment of the lump sum accommodated this reduction in Diane's
living expenses.
c.

The alimony and child support combined came to $1,080

per month, which was less than Diane's minimum monthly living
expenses.

But Diane considered her past income from her law

practice and her expected earnings in the future.

Diane agreed

to $650 per month alimony because the child support and alimony,
plus her income from her practice, would enable her to meet her
minimum monthly living expenses plus allow extra to maintain the
standard of living she and her child enjoyed during the marriage.
d.

The alimony would terminate no later than five years

from the date of entry of the divorce decree to give Diane the
assistance she needed to build her practice and ease her
transition into her career as an attorney, while maintaining her
8

and her child's standard of living.

(R. 426-427)

Jack contends on the other hand that he agreed to $650 per
month alimony and $43 0 per month child support because Diane
represented in the negotiations that she was earning only $80 per
month, insisted her law practice was running at a loss and had no
income, and because she was receiving a substantial property
settlement for her support.

(R. 499-500)

Diane disputes that

any of the foregoing were considerations.
Diane was not earning $80 per month.

The land from which

she was deriving this income had already been sold and the
proceeds awarded to Jack.

(R. 426, 530)

The only time that Diane represented that her law practice
was running a deficit was in February, 1992, in her financial
declaration.
month.

(R. 86)

(R. 423)

At that time she had been in practice one

At the June, 1992 pretrial conference, Jack had

Diane's business records which showed that she was earning
income.

Jack prepare his proposed trial exhibit showing Diane's

income, although it was overstated.

(R. 423-424, 439)

Both

parties were fully aware of Diane's income from her practice when
the final alimony agreement was negotiated on September 1st,
1992.

However, they did not attribute any income to Diane due to

the short time she had been in practice.

(R. 426)

In addition, the property settlement Diane was to receive in
the divorce had no bearing on alimony.

9

(R. 557-558)

She was not

awarded any income producing property.

(R. 557-558)

The total

marital estate was worth approximately $200,000, consisting of:
1) The marital home with equity of approximately $45,000; 2) 2.48
acres in South Jordan, Utah, with equity of approximately
$50,000; 3) 46.89 acres in Colorado with equity of approximately
$10,000; 4)

Pacificorp retirement account worth over $50,000; 5)

1,232 share of Pacificorp stock worth over $30,000; and, 6)
Pacificorp deferred compensation plan worth approximately
$50,000.

Diane was awarded the marital home and Jack was awarded

all the proceeds from the sale of the 2.48 acres in South Jordan.
The residence does not produce income.

Jack was awarded the

46.89 acres in Colorado subject to a lien in Diane's favor for
only $2,000.

Diane's lien does not provide her with any income.

Diane was awarded one half the Pacificorp retirement pursuant to
a QDRO which does not provide income until retirement.

Jack paid

Diane $14,250 in lieu of dividing the over $30,000 in Pacificorp
stock and the Pacificorp deferred compensation plan worth
approximately $50,000.

The $14,250 was used in part to pay off

the second trust deed note, leaving a balance of $6,700 in cash.
Of the marital estate worth approximately $200,000, Jack received
property worth approximately $131,250 and Diane received property
worth approximately $68,750.

Other than $6,700 in cash, all the

property Diane received does not provide any income.
558)

10

(R. 557-

Moreover, Jack admits that Diane's income from her law
practice was contemplated by them at the time alimony was agreed
to.

He states in his affidavit dated April 9th, 1993: "Plaintiff

is currently a member in good standing with the Utah State Bar.
When the divorce was first entered alimony was awarded to give
Plaintiff assistance so that she could have time to build up a
practice and to ease her transition into her career as an
attorney."

(R. 222-227)

He made the same statement under oath

in his affidavit dated June 10th, 1993.

(R. 243-245)

The parties final settlement conference was September 1st,
1992.

At the conference the parties finally settled all of the

issues.

(R. 178-179)

A written settlement agreement was signed

that day and incorporated into the findings of fact, conclusions
of law and divorce decree.
23rd, 1992.

The decree was entered September

(R. 147-164)

Jack made his first written request for Diane's business
records November 25th, 1992, one month after entry of the decree.
(R. 183, 428, 448)

Under the decree Jack is only entitled to

request her records every six months.

Diane responded December

17th, 1992 and again on January 4th, 1993, pointing out that his
request was premature and that he was also behind in his support
payments.
insistent.

(R. 184-186, 428, 449-451)

Jack, however, was

On January 29th, 1993, four months after entry of the

decree, he filed a motion asking the trial court to order Diane

11

to produce her records within thirty days.

(R. 169-172)

He then

amended the motion on February 4th, 1993 to request that Diane
produce her records in ten days.

(R. 173-174)

On February 16th,

1993, the court denied Jack's motion and ordered him to pay Diane
$150 attorney fees for having to defend a spurious motion.

(R.

187-190)
Jack made his second written request on March 1st, 1993.
(R. 428)
return.

Diane produced her business records and 1992 tax
(R. 428)

Jack then filed his petition to terminate

alimony June 18th, 1993, eight and one half months after the
decree was entered.

(R. 240-242)

In support of his petition, Jack calculated that Diane's
average monthly income for 1992 was $872.12, and that her average
monthly income from September, 1992 through February, 1993 was
$1,4 08.18.

This figure was calculated by deducting her normal

business expenses, except car expenses and depreciation, from her
gross receipts.

(R. 240-271)

Diane's average monthly income from her practice in 1993,
less reasonable business expenses was $1,773 before taxes.
taxes, it was $1,303.42.

(R. 429, 481)

After

Her average monthly

income for the first seven months of 1994, less reasonable
business expenses was $1,867.54.
(R. 429-430, 481)

After taxes, it was $1,397.54.

However, her income has been inconsistent from

month to month, ranging from a deficit of $774.39 in one month to

12

gross receipts of $8,663.54 in another month. (R. 430-431)
present average living expenses are $2,221 per month.

Her

(R. 430)

Jack's income has increased from $4,3 00 per month at the
time of the divorce to approximately $5,070 per month.

(R. 636)

Jack contends that Diane is now living beyond the standard
of living they enjoyed during their marriage because her expenses
include $584 per month in car expenses, an increase of $484 per
month over her car expenses at the time of the divorce.
481, 501)

(R. 480-

During their marriage, the parties purchased numerous

vehicles, some of which were new, others of which were 1 or 2
years old.
1973.

For example, they purchased a new AMC Javelin in

They also bought a Triumph TR-7 which was only 1 or 2

years old.

They purchased a Ford Thunderbird which was

relatively new and purchased a new Hyundai Excel off the showroom
floor, among other vehicles.

(R. 501, 558-559)

In the divorce, Diane was awarded a 12 year old Buick and a
14 year old truck.

Both were paid off.

Jack, on the other hand

was awarded a 2 to 3 year old Ford Taurus.

(R. 43 0, 559

the divorce Diane's truck and Buick became unreliable.

After

In fact,

Diane missed one court appearance due to the Buick's
unreliability.

As a result, she replaced the 1980 Buick with a

used, 1992 Ford Explorer.
month.

Her monthly payments are $385 per

With gas and maintenance, her average monthly car expense

is $584. (R. 430, 558-559)
13

Diane has been in practice a relatively short time.

Her

practice has not developed to the point where she can rely on
stable income each month.

If the alimony were terminated, she

would not be able to meet her monthly living expenses or support
herself and her child consistent with the standard of living they
enjoyed during the marriage.

Diane still needs assistance by way

of alimony to continue to build up a practice with stable income
and ease her transition into her career as an attorney.

(R. 430-

431, 559)
III.

Facts Relating to the Attorney Fee Issue.

In order to finance the defense against Jack's petition to
terminate alimony, Diane entered into an agreement with her
attorney to trade services.

Diane represented her attorney in

his divorce in exchange for his services in representing Diane.
They agreed that their respective services would be valued at the
rate of $100 per hour. Diane's attorney's divorce is concluded.
The total time Diane incurred in representing him was 28 hours,
or $2,800.

This amount has been offset, dollar for dollar,

against the time Diane's attorney is incurring in this case.
However, the time that Diane's attorney has incurred, and is
continuing to incur, exceeds the 28 hours she traded.

Thus,

after crediting the 28 hours Diane spent representing her
attorney, she is now indebted to him for the difference.
680, 697-698)
14

(R.

Jack also contends that he has made many attempts to settle
this case but that Diane has refused to enter into any meaningful
negotiations.

(R. 501-502)

The record shows otherwise.

has only offered to terminate alimony altogether.

Jack

(R. 390)

In

approximately May, 1994, Jack offered to terminate alimony in
exchange for which he would not seek a retroactive modification.
In October, 1994, he made the same offer.

Commissioner Michael

Evans recommended that alimony be reduced $80 to $100 per month,
but insisted on termination; so Commissioner Evans certified that
issue for trial.

(R. 390)

Based on Commissioner Evans

recommendation, Diane offered to reduce the alimony $80 per month
effective October, 1994. However, Jack refused to consider any
reduction whatsoever.

(R. 559-561)

Jack further contends that Diane has taken every opportunity
to delay the proceedings, causing him to incur substantial
attorney fees.

(R. 501-502)

Again, the record establishes that

Jack refused to reasonably cooperate in discovery, falsified
information, and increased Diane's attorney fees needlessly.

The

record also demonstrates that Jack never intended to honor the
alimony agreement and, instead, intended to take every action
immediately to seek its termination.

This is shown by the

following:
a.

Jack first requested Diane's records one month

after the decree was entered, even though the decree explicitly
15

provides that he is only entitled to the records every six
months.

He went so far as to file an order to show cause to

obtain the records before the six months.

At the hearing, the

court found that the motion was without merit, and awarded
attorney fees against Jack.
b.

(R. 169-174, 183-190, 428, 449-451)

On March 25th, 1993,

Diane was forced to file an

Order to Show Cause to restrain Jack from harassing and
threatening her.

On March 12th, 1993, Jack called Diane and said

that the alimony was "immoral" and that he "would end it once and
for all, you're going to make me do something insane.
Back."

The restraining order was granted.
c.

Watch your

(R. 196-213, 228-232)

Jack regrets having ever agreed to the payment of

alimony and wishes he had gone to trial instead.
d.

(R. 497-498)

Jack filed his petition to terminate alimony on

June 18th, 1993, eight and one half months after the decree was
entered.

Karl Mangum was his attorney.

Diane voluntarily

accepted service and immediately answered the petition.

(R. 238-

242)
e.
discovery.

On June 22nd, 1993, Diane served Jack with

Jack did not respond and did not seek an extension.

Consequently she sent a letter demanding his answers within ten
days.

(R. 562, 576)

Jack finally answered the discovery, but

failed to provide much of the information.

Consequently, on

August 24th, 1993, Diane sent Jack's attorney a letter requesting

16

the missing information.
577)

Jack did not respond.

(R. 277, 563,

Instead, on August 31st, 1993, he filed a certificate of

readiness for trial.
f.

(R. 278, 563)

Because the discovery was incomplete, Diane

objected to the certificate of readiness for the trial and filed
a motion to compel which was set for hearing on October 19th,
1993.

Diane also sent another letter requesting that Jack

provide the missing information.
g.
15th, 1994.

(R. 279-310, 563, 580)

Jack's attorney, Karl Mangum, withdrew on October
Harry Caston entered his appearance.

(R. 314-317)

After discussing the pending objection and motion to compel, the
parties entered into a written agreement continuing the hearing
without date and obligating Jack, under court order, to provide
the missing information within 10 days of the date the agreement
was signed.
h.

(R.

326-333, 563-564)

Jack failed to comply with the agreement.

Consequently, on December 8th, 1993, Diane was forced to file an
Order to Show Cause in re Contempt to force Jack to provide the
missing information.

The Order to Show Cause was set for hearing

on December 28th, 1993.

In addition, Diane sent another letter

to Jack's attorney attempting to resolve Jack's refusal to comply
with the agreement.
i.

(R. 334-351, 564, 614-616)

On December 17th, 1993, Jack provided supplemental

answers to the discovery.

(R. 3 52)
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However, some of the

information was still missing. On December 21st, 1993, Diane sent
Jack's attorney another letter to attempt to solve this problem.
Jack's attorney promised that the missing information would be
provided, so Diane cancelled the December 28th, 1993 hearing.
(R. 564, 617)
j.
twice.

On January 4th, 1994, Jack amended his petition

Diane cooperated fully in allowing the amendments without

a hearing and immediately answered the amended petitions.

(R.

356-368, 564)
k.
attorney.

On March 7th, 1994, Harry Caston withdrew as Jack's

On March 18th, 1994, Jeff B. Skoubye appeared as

Jack's new attorney.
1.

(R. 369-374)

In March, 1994, the parties agreed to exchange 1993

tax returns, rather than pursue formal discovery.

Diane gave

Jack her 1993 return on May 5th, 1994, and requested Jack's. He
only provided his bare tax return without any supporting
schedules or W-2's.
schedules and W-2's.
$54,351.

On May 16th, 1994, he gave Diane the
The

The tax return and W-2 showed wages of

(R. 565, 618-630)
m.

In preparation for a pretrial conference, Jack

filed his financial declaration dated June 10th, 1994,
representing, under oath, that his gross monthly income was
$4,550, consistent with his 1993 W-2 and tax return previously
given to Diane.

He also claimed monthly expenses of $3,74 5, in
18

addition to alimony and child support in this case.
n.

(R. 379-383)

Immediately prior to the pretrial conference, it

came to Diane's attention that Jack falsified his 1993 tax return
and W-2 and lied about his income in his financial declaration.
(R. 565)

Diane notified Jack's attorney.

The day before the

pretrial, Jack handdelivered his correct 1993 tax return and W-2
and a corrected financial declaration dated July 19th, 1994
showing that his true income was over $5070 per month.

At the

pretrial, Jack's attorney stated that he instructed his client
not to engage in this kind of conduct again.

(R. 391-395, 565-

566, 636-652)
o.
15th, 1994.

Jack did not pursue any discovery until August
Diane answered timely.

(R. 398, 566)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

The Mere Existence of Genuine Issues of Fact Does
Not Preclude the Entry of Summary Judgment.
In reviewing a summary judgment, the Court of Appeals

applies the same analytical standard required of the trial court.
Summary judgment is not precluded whenever some fact remains in
dispute, just when genuine material facts pertinent to the issues
are in dispute.

This is a case where Jack's disputed facts are

immaterial to the resolution of this case.
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II.

Summary Judgment Was Proper Because Diane's Income From Her
Law Practice Was Contemplated Within The Decree And Jack
Failed To Establish Any Genuine Issue Of Fact To The
Contrary.
On a petition to modify alimony, the moving party must first

show a substantial change of circumstances since the decree that
was not contemplated in the decree itself.

The burden with

respect to modifications based on a stipulated settlement is
particularly high.
Jack claims that Diane's income from her law practice is not
contemplated in the decree and constitutes a substantial change
in her financial circumstances.

He relies solely on the

statement in the stipulated settlement agreement concerning
Diane's historical income at the time.

That does not determine

the issue of whether future income was contemplated.
The court must consider evidence concerning the
contemplation of the parties and decree as to Diane's income from
her law practice.

The undisputed facts and language from the

stipulated agreement show the parties contemplation of Diane's
future income at the time the alimony agreement was made.
Jack's reliance on the statement in the stipulated
settlement agreement reciting Diane's historical income from
boarding horses ignores the undisputed facts and language of the
decree and does not create a genuine issue as to the
contemplation of Diane's future income from her law practice.
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The doctrine of res judicata has no application to the facts
of this case.

The doctrine of res judicata precludes the

relitigation of all issues that could
well as those that were litigated.

have been litigated as

The parties stipulated that

Diane's "present" income at the time of the divorce was her
historical income from boarding horses.

It has no bearing on the

issue of the contemplation of Diane's anticipated income from her
law practice.

Consequently there is no relitigation of that

issue.
III. Summary Judgment Was Proper Because Jack Failed
To Show Any Genuine Issue of Fact as to a Substantial
Change in Diane's Financial Circumstances or as to
Diane's Ability to Support Herself.
The financial facts pertaining to Diane's income and
expenses are undisputed.

Her annual income has increased only

$5,000 to $7,000 which is not a substantial change of
circumstances.

Jack failed to show any genuine issue of fact

pertinent to this issue.
Jack claims that Diane insisted she was not making money in
her practice during their negotiations.

Diane disputes this.

Even if Jack's claim is true, the undisputed facts show that
alimony and child support were not enough to cover Diane's
monthly living expenses, she was not awarded any income producing
assets, Jack had her business records showing income, Diane had
been in practice the previous eight months, and the alimony
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agreement centers its provisions around Diane's income from her
law practice.

Consequently, Jack's issue, even if true, is

immaterial to resolution of the case.
Jack also raises an issue that Diane earns enough money to
provide for her own support, centering his claim on a car expense
which he contends is extravagant. However, the undisputed facts
show that Jack and Diane bought numerous vehicles during the
marriage, some of which were new and some of which were only 1 to
2 years old.

Even deducting this car expense, the undisputed

facts show that Diane is not making enough to provide for her own
support.

The undisputed facts also show that Jack's claim that

Diane's car expense is beyond the standard of living enjoyed by
them during the marriage is simply a bare allegation unsupported
by the facts.
Consequently, those facts that Jack contends were genuinely
disputed, taken as a whole, do not preclude the entry of summary
IV.

The Trial Court Did Not Err in Finding That Jack's
Litigation Was Without Merit and Brought in
Bad Faith and in Awarding Attorney Fees to Diane.
The facts concerning Jack's litigation establish each of the

elements necessary for an award of attorney fees under Section
78-27-56.

These facts consist of the following:

1.

Diane prevailed.

2.

After the decree was entered, Jack harassed and

threatened Diane stating that his payment of alimony was immoral
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and that he "would end it once and for all, you're going to make
me do something insane.
3.

Watch your back."

The decree provided that Jack was entitled to Diane's

records from her law practice every six months.

Only one month

after entry of the decree, Jack made demand for her records. He
then filed a motion four months after the decree was entered to
compel the production of her records, resulting in sanctions
being assessed against him for a spurious action.
4.

Diane produced her records in March, 1993.

Then Jack

filed his petition to terminate the alimony only eight and one
half months after the decree was entered.
5. Jack never considered or offered a reduction in alimony
before the trial court and consistently insisted on complete,
retroactive termination, even after Commissioner Evans
recommendation that alimony be reduced $80 to $100. The only
relief Jack sought on his cross motion for summary judgment was
complete termination of alimony.
6.

Jack objects to the payment of alimony, regrets that he

agreed to pay alimony, wishing instead that he had gone to trial
7.

The plain language of the decree and the facts at the

time of the divorce show that Diane's income from her practice
was contemplated by the parties and in the decree.

Jack's

position that it was never contemplated is untenable.
8.

During the litigation, Jack refused to reasonable
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cooperate in Diane's discovery requests.
9.

During the litigation, Jack refused to honor a written

agreement and a court order designed to remedy his refusal to
completely answer Diane's discovery and expedite the case.
10.

During the litigation, Jack falsified his 1993 tax

returns and W-2 and filed a false financial declaration with the
court, signed under oath.
11.

Jack went through multiple attorneys during the

litigation.
12.

Jack did not pursue any discovery on his own behalf

until one year and two months after he filed his petition.
Based upon the foregoing, all the necessary requirements
under Section 78-27-56 for an award of attorney fees have been
met.

Diane prevailed in the action.

and brought in bad faith.

The claim was without merit

The trial court's judgment in this

regard is not clearly erroneous.
Jack claims that Diane did not incur any fees because she
agreed with her attorney to trade services on a dollar for dollar
basis.

The trade of services is a legitimate transaction for

valuable consideration and is time that Diane and her attorney
could have spent for paying clients.

Trade of services provides

a legitimate basis for the trial court's determination that Diane
has incurred attorney fees in her case.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE MERE EXISTENCE OF GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT DOES
NOT PRECLUDE THE ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
In reviewing a summary judgment, the Court of Appeals

applies the same analytical standard required of the trial court.
Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah App.
1988) .

That standard dictates that the facts must be liberally

construed and the evidence viewed in a light most favorable to
the party opposing the motion.

Id.

Summary judgment is

appropriate if the pleadings and all other submissions show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Utah R.

Civ. P., Rule 56.
Summary judgment is not precluded, however, whenever some
fact remains in dispute, only when material facts are genuinely
controverted.

Hecrlar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 619 P. 2d 1390,

1391 (Utah 1980).

In Horqan v. Industrial Design Corp.. 657 P.2d

751, 752 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court explained that ". .
. the mere existence of genuine issues of fact in the case as a
whole does not preclude the entry of summary judgment if those
issues are immaterial to resolution of the case."

In Salt Lake

City Corp. v. James Constructors, 761 P.2d 42, 45 (Utah App.
1988) this Court further explained that when it appears there is
no reasonable probability that the party moved against could
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prevail, summary judgment should be granted.
In his petition to terminate alimony, Jack had the
threshold requirement of showing a substantial change in Diane's
financial circumstances since the divorce that was not
contemplated within the decree.

He contends that Diane's income

from her law practice is not contemplated within the decree and
constitutes a substantial change warranting the termination of
alimony.2

The trial court found that Diane's income from

practicing law was contemplated at the time of the divorce and
within the decree and that there is not a substantial change in
her income.
On appeal, Jack has the added burden of showing a genuine
issue of fact on this point.

While Jack may have shown some

genuine issues of fact, this is a case where his disputed facts
are immaterial to the resolution of this case.

The trial court

did not err because, even considering Jack's issues, he failed to
show any reasonable probability of prevailing at trial.
II.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER BECAUSE DIANE'S INCOME FROM HER
LAW PRACTICE WAS CONTEMPLATED WITHIN THE DECREE AND JACK
FAILED TO ESTABLISH ANY GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT TO THE
CONTRARY.
On a petition to modify alimony, the moving party must first

2

In Jack's cross motion for summary judgment, he asked for
judgment completely terminating alimony. He never asked the
trial court to consider the issue of reducing alimony.
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show a substantial change of circumstances since the decree that
was not contemplated in the decree itself.

In Moore v. Moore,

872 P.2d 1054, 1055 (Utah App. 1994), this Court explained this
rule of law as follows:
On a petition for a modification of a divorce decree,
the threshold requirement for relief is a showing of a
substantial change of circumstances occurring since the
entry of the decree and not contemplated in the decree
itself. 236 Utah Adv. Rep. at 27, [citing Purfee v.
Durfee, 796 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah App. 1990)(emphasis
added)(quoting Stettler v. Stettler, 713 P.2d 699, 701
(Utah 1985)].
The Utah Supreme Court has further held that the burden with
respect to modifications of divorce decrees based on stipulated
settlement agreements, as is the case here, is particularly high.
Lea v. Bowers, 658 P.2d 1213, 1215 (Utah 1983).
As explained previously, Jack claimed that Diane's income
from her law practice is not contemplated in the decree and
constitutes a substantial change in her financial circumstances.
To support this claim, Jack relied solely on the statement in the
stipulated settlement agreement to the effect that the parties
alimony agreement is based upon Diane's present income of $80 per
month and Jack's present income of $4,300 per month.3

3

However, a

The pertinent language from paragraph 12 of the agreement
reads: "The parties stipulate and agree that plaintiff's present
gross monthly income is $80.00 and that defendant's gross monthly
income from his employment is $4,300. Based upon the respective
parties' income as set forth herein, it is stipulated and agreed
that the defendant will pay to the plaintiff, alimony . . . "
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recitation stating the parties present income at the time of the
divorce does not determine the issue of whether future income was
contemplated.

Rather, as shown by the following cases, the court

must consider the evidence concerning the contemplation of the
parties and the decree as to future income.
In Moore vs. Moore, 872 P.2d 1054, the parties were married
sixteen years and had three children at the time the decree was
entered.

The decree was based upon the parties stipulation and

property settlement agreement.

At the time of the divorce the

parties1 adjusted gross income was $40,996, the majority of which
was Mr. Moore's income. Mrs. Moore was employed part time for
five dollars per hour.

Also, at the time of the divorce, the

parties discussed Mrs. Moore's plan to recertify as a school
teacher or to obtain a master's degree in sociology - - although
this discussion and plan, or any mention of Mrs. Moore's
contemplated future income, were not set forth in the agreement,
the findings of fact, or the decree of divorce.
In the decree Mr. Moore was required to pay $1,150 per month
alimony during the first year following the divorce and $1,050
per month thereafter.

He was also ordered to pay $750 per month

child support.
In October, 1989, he filed his petition for modification of
the decree asking that his alimony be terminated.

The trial

court decided that a substantial change of material circumstances
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had occurred because the parties1 children were emancipated and
Mrs. Moore had a stable income.

The trial court specifically

found that she had an income of $1,373 per month, the same amount
she would have earned if she had been employed as a school
teacher at the time of the divorce.

The court also found that

she had reasonable monthly expenses of $2,783.87.

Based on these

findings, the court granted Mr. Moore's petition and reduced the
alimony from $1,050 per month to one dollar per month beginning
November, 1992.
This Court reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the
original $1050 alimony award.4

After analyzing the trial court's

findings, this Court held that the fact that Mrs. Moore presently
has a stable income cannot be considered a change of
circumstances, stating:
The parties obviously contemplated that Mrs. Moore
would earn approximately $1300 at the time the divorce
decree was entered. Mrs. Moore's stable level of
income was anticipated at the time of the divorce when
the original alimony award was set. Thus, the court
incorrectly determined that Mrs. Moore's present,
stable income was a substantial change in her material
circumstances.
872 P.2d at 1056.
In Dana v. Dana, 789 P.2d 726 (Utah App. 1990) this Court

4

The Court of Appeals did not address the issue of whether a
child reaching majority constitutes a substantial, material
change in circumstances.
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again considered evidence of the parties contemplation at the
time of the divorce, even though the decree was silent on the
issue of anticipated future income.

In that case, the parties

were divorced in January, 1983. Mrs. Dana was earning $3,000 per
year babysitting in her home.
year.

Mr. Dana was earning $21,000 per

He was ordered to pay $165 per month per child as child

support.

In 1987, he filed a petition to reduce his child

support based upon Mrs. Dana's increase in annual income to
$17,000 per year, plus his own added obligation to support two
additional children after the divorce.

The trial court found a

substantial change of circumstances due to Mrs. Dana's increased
income from $3,000 per year to $17,000 per year, and Mr. Dana's
additional child support responsibility.
This Court reversed, holding:
The court's conclusion that plaintiff's increase of
annual earnings from $3,000 in 1983 to $17,000 in 1987
constitutes a substantial change in circumstances is
erroneous. It ignores the defendant's testimony that,
at the time of the divorce decree, the court
anticipated plaintiff would increase her earnings from
$10,000 to $12,000 shortly after the divorce, by
finding outside employment. A change of circumstances
reasonably contemplated at the time of divorce is not
legally cognizable as a substantial change in
circumstances in modification proceedings. Based on
the Court's reasonable anticipation of plaintiff's
earnings, her income increased by only $5,000 to
$7,000, and not $14,000 during the five years following
the divorce.
789 P.2d at 729, (emphasis added).
In this case, Jack's reliance on the parties recitation of
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Dianefs historical income from boarding horses, $80 per month,
does not address the issue of whether Diane's future income from
her law practice was reasonable contemplated.

Instead, the

undisputed facts concerning the parties contemplation and
financial circumstances at the time of the divorce, and the
language of the stipulated agreement, conclusively show that
Diane's future income was anticipated.

The undisputed facts and

language from the stipulated agreement that show this include the
following:
1.

Jack admits in his April 9th, 1993 affidavit, and his

June 10th, 1993 affidavit:

"When the divorce was first entered

alimony was awarded to give Plaintiff assistance so that she
could have time to build up a practice and to ease her transition
into her career as an attorney."
2.

The stipulated agreement provides a maximum time frame

of five years for payment of alimony, which is a clear indication
that the parties contemplated an appropriate time period for
Diane to establish a stable income from her practice at a level
sufficient for her to provide for her own support.
3.

At the time of the divorce, Jack was aware that Diane

had been practicing law the previous eight months.

This was

disclosed in Diane's February, 1992 financial declaration.

Jack

also had all of Diane's business records from her practice by the
end of April, 1992.
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4.

At the pretrial in June, 1992, Jack knew Diane was then

earning income in her practice.

He prepared a proposed trial

exhibit showing Diane's income of $1,42 6.10 per month after
deducting business expenses.
5.

At the time of the divorce, Diane's monthly living

expenses were $1,439.10. The agreed upon alimony and child
support came to $1,080 per month, an amount insufficient for
Diane to meet her monthly expenses unless her income from her law
practice was contemplated.

Additionally, Diane's property

settlement did not include any income producing assets to
supplement her support.
6.

The stipulated agreement and the decree clearly

contemplate Diane's future income because it provides that
alimony may terminate sooner than five years upon the showing of
a change in Diane's financial circumstances and her ability to
provide for her own support.5
7. The decree also contemplates Diane's future income
because it provides for Jack's right to request her business
records from her law practice every six months upon written
request and for his right to petition the court by way of motion
5

This provision of paragraph 13 of the decree reads:
"Defendant's obligation to pay alimony to the plaintiff shall
terminate within five years from the entry of a decree of divorce
herein, or at such time as the Court may order, based upon a
change in plaintiff's circumstances and plaintiff's ability to
provide for her own support."
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for a reduction in alimony payments based on changes in her
income from time to time.6
8.

The land from which Diane was deriving income of $80 per

month boarding horses during the divorce had been sold,
terminating that income.
The foregoing is undisputed.

Nevertheless, Jack relies on

the statement in the stipulated settlement agreement reciting
Diane's historical income from boarding horses.

That statement

does not address the contemplation of the decree, or the parties,
concerning Diane's active practice of law and her income from her
practice at the time.

The statement identifying Diane's income

from boarding horses, which had terminated, simply does not

6

This provision from paragraph 13 of the decree reads: "It
is stipulated and agreed that for purposes of determining
defendant's continued obligation to pay alimony to plaintiff,
plaintiff will provide to defendant at his request, through her
counsel Ronald E. Kunz, copies of plaintiff's business records
and tax returns, for purposes of determining plaintiff's
continued need to receive alimony from the defendant. It is
further agreed that defendant shall be entitled to receive such
financial information from the plaintiff every six months, and
such information shall be provided by plaintiff to the defendant
within thirty days after receiving written request therefore. It
is agreed that the defendant may petition the Court, by way of
Motion, for a reduction in alimony payments and an adjustment of
child support based on changes in the Plaintiff's income from
time to time."
Jack never asked for a reduction in alimony. At the
pretrial settlement conference before Commissioner Evans, he
refused to consider any option but a complete termination of
alimony. (R. 390) Likewise, in his cross motion for summary
judgment he was requesting judgment that alimony be completely
terminated retroactively.
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create a genuine issue as to the contemplation of Dianefs future
income from her law practice.

It was clearly contemplated.

Moreover, Jack's argument that the doctrine of res judicata
prohibits the consideration of anything but the statement
concerning Diane's historical income from boarding horses has no
application to the facts of this case.

The doctrine of res

judicata precludes the relitigation of all issues that could
have been litigated as well as those that were litigated.

Estate

of Covington v. Josephson, 888 P.2d 675, (Utah App. 1994).

The

parties stipulated that Diane's "present" income at the time of
the divorce was her historical income from boarding horses.

This

recitation of her "present" income has no bearing on the issue of
the contemplation of Diane's anticipated income from her law
practice.

The undisputed facts and the language of the decree

center on Diane's future income from her law practice, as the
trial court found, not on Diane's historical income cited in the
agreement.

Consequently, that issue is not being relitigated.

The trial court also found from the undisputed facts that
the parties did anticipate that Diane was commencing a law
practice, that she had not been in extensive work up to the time
of the divorce, and that Jack would know what her income was from
her law practice every six months.

(R. 708)

The trial court's

decision was premised on the undisputed facts and language from
the decree, itemized above.

Jack's reliance on the statement
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concerning Diane's historical income from boarding horses does
not establish any genuine issue of fact concerning the
contemplation of Diane's future income.
III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER BECAUSE JACK FAILED
TO SHOW ANY GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT AS TO A SUBSTANTIAL
CHANGE IN DIANE'S FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OR AS TO
DIANE'S ABILITY TO SUPPORT HERSELF.
Given the undisputed facts and the language from the
stipulated settlement agreement, Jack nevertheless bears the
burden of showing a substantial change in Diane's financial
circumstances not reasonably contemplated at the time of the
divorce.

Moore vs. Moore, 872 P.2d 1054.

However, Jack failed

to establish any genuine issue of fact pertaining to this issue.
The following financial facts are undisputed:
1.

Jack's, June 1992 proposed trial exhibit attributes

Diane with $1,426.10 monthly income from her law practice, after
deducting expenses, although it was overstated.

Her actual

annual income for 1992 was $10,465, ($872.12 per month).

Her

actual monthly income from September, 1992 through February, 1993
was $1,408.18.
2.

(R. 244)

Diane's annual income in 1993, after taxes and business

expenses was $15,641, ($1,303.42 per month).
3.

Her income for the first seven months in 1994, after

taxes and business expenses, was $9,782.78, ($1,397.54 per
month).
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4.

In 1993, Diane's income increased only $5,000 over what

she actually made in 1992, although it did not increase over the
amount Jack attributed to her in his June, 1992 trial exhibit, or
from what she made from September, 1992 through February, 1993.
5.

In 1994, Diane's income increased only $6,000 over what

she actually made in 1992, although it did not increase over the
amount Jack attributed to her in his June, 1992 trial exhibit, or
from what she made from September, 1992 through February, 1993.
6.

Diane's income is not yet stable or consistent, ranging

from a loss of $774 in one month to receipts of $8,663 in another
month.
7.

Her current monthly living expenses come to $2,221,

which include a $389 payment on a used 1992 Ford Explorer she
purchased to replace a 12 year old Buick she was awarded in the
divorce.

Her average income from 1993 and 1994, $1,350 per

month, is not sufficient to cover her expenses.
In the Dana case, 789 P.2d 726, this Court held that
"parties to a divorce decree will undoubtedly experience economic
and other changes following a divorce, but a modification in the
decree is justified only when a party shows a substantial change
in circumstances."

This Court went on to hold that an increase

in annual income of only $5,000 to $7000 is not a substantial
change in circumstances.

Likewise, the increase in Diane's

annual income of only $5,000 to $7,000 is not a substantial
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change of circumstances.
Consistent with the Dana case, supra, the trial court also
found that Diane's income since the divorce was undisputed and
that there had not been a sufficient change of circumstances to
warrant the termination of alimony.

(R. 709). Given the

undisputed facts, the trial court did not err in granting summary
judgment to Diane.

Jack simply failed to show any genuine issue

of fact pertinent to this issue.
Jack identifies some issues which he contends are genuinely
disputed.

As explained previously however, the mere existence of

genuine issues of fact in the case as a whole does not preclude
the entry of summary judgment if those issues are immaterial to
resolution of the case.

Horgan v. Industrial Design Corp., 657

P.2d 751. Those issues that Jack contends are genuinely disputed
are immaterial to the resolution of this case.
One such issue is Jack's claim that during the negotiations,
Diane insisted she was not making money in her practice, and that
alimony was based solely on this representation with no
contemplation or anticipation of her future income.7

Diane

disputes this and claims that she discussed hpr income with Jack

7

This is not a genuinely disputed fact in light of the
undisputed evidence concerning Jack's June, 1992 trial exhibit,
the fact that Diane was in practice at least eight months at the
time of the divorce, and language of the decree contemplating her
future income.
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and pointed out that the income shown in his June 1992 trial
exhibit was overstated because it included the money borrowed
from her mother.

Even if Jack's claim is true, the undisputed

facts remain that, at the time of the divorce, alimony and child
support were not enough to cover Diane's monthly living expenses,
she was not awarded any income producing assets, Jack had her
business records showing income, Diane had been in practice the
previous eight months, and the alimony agreement centers its
provisions around Diane's income from her law practice.
Consequently, even though this issue of fact exists, it is
immaterial to the resolution of this case.
Another issue that Jack raises is his contention that Diane
earns enough money to provide for her own support.8

This issue

centers on Jack's claim that Diane's current monthly expenses are
beyond the standard of living enjoyed by the parties during their
marriage because they include a $385 car payment.

He claims that

without this expense, her current monthly expenses are $1,737 and
that Diane makes enough to provide for these expenses.

Even

though there may be a genuine issue concerning the $385 car
payment as it pertains to the standard of living Diane enjoyed in
8

However, the decree provides that Jack must not only show
that Diane can provide for her own support, he must also show
that there has been a substantial change of circumstances. As
set forth under Point II, Jack has not shown any substantial
change in Diane's circumstances that was not contemplated at the
time of the divorce.
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the marriage, this issue is immaterial to resolution of the case.
It is undisputed that Diane had to replace her 12 year old
Buick because it became unreliable.

Jack claims that Diane could

have found a cheaper car for around $10,000, thereby reducing her
car payments.

However, the $1,737 he claims should be Diane's

monthly expenses does not allow for any gas, maintenance or any
other car payment.

Jack came up with $1,737 by not only

deducting the $385 car payment, he also deducted all expenses for
gas and maintenance, except for $100 per month.

Even taking

Jack's assertions as true, amounts must be added back in for a
replacement vehicle and associated gas and maintenance increasing
Diane's monthly expenses under Jack's scenario to around $2,000
per month, depending upon the amount Jack would consider
reasonable for the replacement vehicle.

Her average monthly

income for 1993 and 1994, plus child support, is still
insufficient to provide for these expenses.

Consequently, while

Jack may claim a genuine issue as to Diane's monthly car expense,
this issue is immaterial to the resolution of the case because,
even taken as true, he cannot show a substantial change of
circumstances or that Diane can provide for her own support.
Jack also asserts that Diane's purchase of her 1992 used
Ford Explorer is beyond the standard of living of the parties.
This assertion, however, is simply a bare allegation, not
supported by the undisputed facts.
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Both parties admit that,

during their marriage, they purchased many vehicles including,
but not limited to, a brand new AMC Javelin, a Triumph TR-7 which
was only 1 or 2 years old, a relatively new Ford Thunderbird, and
a new Hyundai Excel bought of the showroom floor.

Diane's

purchase of her used 1992 Ford Explorer is not inconsistent with
these undisputed facts.

Jack's assertion otherwise is a bare

allegation contrary to the facts and immaterial to a resolution
of this case.
In light of the undisputed financial facts, Jack has not
shown any genuine issue of material fact which, when viewed in
his favor, would establish a substantial change of circumstances
not contemplated at the time of the divorce, or that would
establish that Diane has the ability to support herself.

Her

current income is not significantly different from the income
Jack attributed to her in his June, 1992 trial exhibit, or her
actual 1992 income.

Those facts that Jack contends were

genuinely disputed, taken as a whole, do not preclude the entry
of summary judgment because they are immaterial to resolution of
the case.

Diane's practice is simply not stable enough, nor does

it produce enough income, for Diane to meet her reasonable
monthly expenses, even after taking Jack's assertions as true.
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IV.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT JACK'S
LITIGATION WAS WITHOUT MERIT, BROUGHT IN
BAD FAITH AND IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES TO DIANE.
Utah Code Anno. § 78-27-56 (1953), as amended provides:
In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable
attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court
determines that the action or defense to the action was
without merit and not brought or asserted in good
faith, except under Subsection (2).
This Court addressed this statute in the case Utah Dep't of

Social Services v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah App. 1991)
and stated:
An award of attorney fees premised on a finding of bad
faith is, to an extent, a matter within the discretion
of the trial court, and appellate deference is owed to
the trial judge who actually presided over the
proceeding and has first-hand familiarity with the
litigation.
(citation omitted).
This Court also held in the case Hermes Associates v. Park's
Sportsman, 813 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah App. 1991) that three
requirements must be met before the court can award attorney fees
under this section: "(1) the party must prevail, (2) the claim
asserted by the opposing party must be without merit, and (3) the
claim must not be brought or asserted in good faith."
This Court further explained these requirements and the
standard of review in the case Jeschke v. Willis. 811 P.2d 202
(Utah App. 1991).

In that case, this Court held:

To prove that a claim is "without merit" under the
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statute, the party asserting an award of attorney fees
must first demonstrate that the claim is "frivolous" or
"of little weight or importance having no basis in law
or fact." Cadv v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah
1983) . The "without merit" determination is a question
of law, and therefore we review it for correctness. See
Comment, Attorney's Fees in Bad Faith, Meritless
Actions, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 593, 598. Second, the party
must prove that the plaintiff's conduct in bringing the
suit was lacking in good faith. This lack of good faith
turns on subjective intent, and for purposes of the
statute, is synonymous with a finding of "bad faith."
Cady, 671 P.2d at 151-52; Taylor v. Estate of Taylor,
770 P.2d 163, 171 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). A finding of
bad faith is a question of fact and is reviewed by this
court under the "clearly erroneous" standard. See,
e.g., Topik v. Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101, 1104 & n. 5
(Utah 1987); cf. Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781
P.2d 414, 421 (Utah 1989) (determination of bad faith
reviewed for an abuse of discretion).
811 P.2d at 203-204.
In this case, the trial found that Jack's action was without
merit and in bad faith and awarded attorney fees to Diane.
724-726)

(R.

The facts concerning Jack's litigation establish each

of the elements necessary for an award of attorney fees under
Section 78-27-56.

These facts consist of the following:

1.

Diane prevailed.

2.

After the decree was entered, Jack harassed and

threatened Diane, forcing her to obtain a restraining order.
Jack threatened that his payment of alimony was immoral and that
he "would end it once and for all, you're going to make me do
something insane.
3.

Watch your back."

The decree was entered September 23rd, 1992, after final
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settlement negotiations on September 1st, 1992. The decree
explicitly provided that Jack was only entitled to Diane's
records from her law practice every six months.

Yet, only one

month after entry of the decree, Jack made demand for her
records.

He then filed a motion four months after the decree was

entered to compel the production of her records, resulting in
sanctions being assessed against him for a spurious action.
4.

Diane produced her records in March, 1993, after Jack

made another demand.

Then Jack filed his petition to terminate

the alimony only eight and one half months after the decree was
entered.
5.

While Jack contends on appeal that the issue of

reduction of alimony should have been considered, he never
considered reduction before the trial court and consistently
insisted on complete, retroactive termination.

His only offer to

Diane during the litigation was termination of alimony, in
exchange for which he would not seek retroactive termination.

At

the pretrial conference Commissioner Evans recommended that the
alimony be reduced $80 to $100 per month.

Jack absolutely

refused to consider a reduction, insisting on complete
termination, even though Diane later indicated her willingness to
follow Commissioner Evan's recommendation and reduce the alimony
$80 per month.

(R. 390, 561)

In his cross motion for summary

judgment, the only relief Jack sought was complete termination of
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alimony.
6.

(R. 493)
Jack objects to the payment of alimony because he feels

like he is being forced to finance Dianefs fledgling law
practice, despite the fact that she was married to Jack for
nineteen years and did not worked for fifteen years.

Jack does

not like the settlement agreement because it includes alimony and
he is now sorry that he agreed to pay it.
7.

(R. 497-498)

The plain language of the decree and the factual

circumstances concerning Diane's law practice clearly show that
her income from her practice was contemplated by the parties and
in the decree.

Yet Jack continues to press the untenable

position that her income from her practice was never
contemplated.
8.

During the litigation, Jack refused to reasonable

cooperate in Diane's discovery requests.
9.

During the litigation, Jack refused to honor a written

agreement and a court order designed to remedy his refusal to
completely answer Diane's discovery and expedite the case.
10.

During the litigation, Jack falsified his 1993 tax

returns and W-2 and filed a false financial declaration with the
court, signed under oath.
11.

Jack went through multiple attorneys during the

litigation.
12.

Jack did not pursue any discovery on his own behalf
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until one year and two months after he filed his petition•
Based upon the foregoing, all the necessary requirements
under Section 78-27-56 for an award of attorney fees have been
met.

Diane prevailed in the action.

merit.

The claim was without

The undisputed facts and the clear language of the decree

show that Diane's income from her law practice was contemplated.
Moreover, the undisputed financial facts show that a substantial
change of circumstances has not occurred since entry of the
decree and that Diane cannot presently provide for her own full
support.

In fact, Jack admits that the alimony was to provide

her assistance in establishing a stable practice and assisting
her transition into her career as an attorney.

Lastly, the

action was brought in bad faith as shown by Jack's threats, his
regret at having agreed to the payment of alimony, and his
actions to obtain records and bring his action with the intent to
terminate alimony altogether almost immediately after entry of
the decree.
agreement.

Jack clearly did not intend to honor the alimony
Instead, he wanted to terminate alimony altogether as

soon after the decree was entered as possible.
The trial court's determination that Jack's action was
without merit and not brought in good faith is not clearly
erroneous.

The trial court did not err in awarding attorney fees

to Diane.
Jack also contends that the award of attorney fees to Diane
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was inappropriate because she did not incur any fees.

Diane and

her attorney entered into an agreement to trade services at the
rate of $100 per hour.
divorce.

Diane represented her attorney in his

The time she incurred on his behalf was 28 hours, the

equivalent of $2,800.

This has been offset dollar for dollar

against the time that Diane's attorney has incurred in this case.
However, that time has far exceeded the 28 hours Diane traded and
she is now indebted to her attorney for the amount of time he has
incurred in excess of the 28 hours.
The trade of services is a legitimate transaction for
valuable consideration.

In the case DeMentas v. Estate of Jack

Tallas, 764 P.2d 628 (Utah App. 1988), this Court affirmed the
general definition of valuable consideration.

That definition is

that valuable consideration is any legal detriment bargained for
and exchanged for a promise.

This Court further affirmed the

rule that there is valuable consideration whenever a promisor
receives a benefit or where the promisee suffers a detriment,
however slight.
In this case Diane suffered a detriment of significant value
by representing her attorney in his divorce.

This is time that

Diane would otherwise have spent representing a paying client.
Her attorney suffered a detriment of significant value by
representing Diane, instead of representing a paying client.

In

fact, she is now accruing an attorney fee debt after crediting 28
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hours against the time her attorney has incurred in this case.
In addition, both Diane and her attorney received the benefit of
representation in their respective case.

There is no question

that the bargain between Diane and her attorney is supported by
consideration of significant value which provides a legitimate
basis for the trial court's determination that Diane has incurred
attorney fees in her case.

CONCLUSION
Based upon all of the foregoing, Diane respectfully prays
that the trial court's summary judgment and award of attorney
fees in her favor be affirmed and that the denial of Jack's
cross-motion for summary judgment and Jacks' request for an award
of attorney fees also be affirmed.

Diane further prays for an

award of her costs and attorney fees on appeal and that the
calculation of her attorney fees be remanded to the trial court,
in accordance with this Court's ruling in the case Utah Dep't of
Social Services v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193.
DATED this 9th day of August, 1995.

JOHNX. RICE
Attorney for Diane S. Jones
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 9th day of August, 1995, I
caused two true and correct copies of the foregoing to be hand
delivered to the following:
Jeff B. Skoubye
8282 South State Street, Suite 18
Midvale, Utah 84047

JOJHtf K. RICE
^tftorney for Appellee
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